most food was produced using traditional methods without heavy use of chemical fertilisers, pesticides and additives. Profits were not the aim food producers because the entire food production chain, from the materials, equipment and technologies, to distribution and sale, were centrally planned and controlled by the state. Food safety accidents were occasional, but did not damage the overall image of food safety.
4
Following the Cultural Revolution and with the economic reforms at the end of 1970s, many new laws and regulations were renewed or enacted. In 1979 the Regulations on the Administration of Food Hygiene was drafted. They were based on the 1965 Regulations and took into account the new economic situation. Three years later, the new regulations were replaced by a new version in 1982. This was the Food Hygiene Law. This was also a trial implementation to accommodate the situation of continuing economic reforms was still underway and frequent policy changes. The revised and current Food Hygiene Law was implemented in 1995.
The government is trying to use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides
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5
This paper will outline China's current legislation on food safety and evaluate its role as well as problems arising from it. We will look first at the law on the safety of "straight" food, and then at that on genetically modified (GM) food. A commentary on the enforcement of food safety law will follow and on the implications of China's experience for other developing countries.
Current legislation 6
The 1995 Food Hygiene Law forms the basis of the legal framework for food safety in China. Ironically perhaps, neither the 1995 Food Hygiene Law nor its predecessors provide a definition for "food hygiene". In the 1982 Food Hygiene Law the main concerns with regard to hygiene focused on rotten or dirty food or food capable of causing poisoning, or food processing that was not clean. However, the scope of the 1995 Food Hygiene Law is not limited only to food hygiene problems; it also covers many safety issues, such as food made with new materials, food in hospitals, food for infants 8 etc.
The 1995 Food Hygiene Law
7
The 1995 Food Hygiene Law, promulgated by the National People's Congress, consists of 57 articles that cover general principles, food hygiene, food additives, packaged and containers of food, the enactment of regulations and hygiene standards on food, the administration of food hygiene, the supervision of food hygiene, penalties, and miscellaneous clauses including definitions. It adds 12 new articles to the 1982 Food Hygiene Law, and makes clear stipulations on the authority responsible for the administration of food hygiene 9 , the supervision of food hygiene by NGOs and individuals, the production of food, food that may not be produced, the absence of drugs in food, and on food for military and the services, etc. Seven new requirements state that 10 :
• the layout of equipment and the processing methods should be reasonable;
• food containers must always be clean;
• the instruments for storage, shipment, loading and unloading must be safe and do not constitute a hazard;
• ready-to-eat food must be packed using materials that are clean and safe;
• the workers must wash their hands and put on clean clothes and headwear before producing or selling food;
• the water used must meet the standards set by the state; and
• the wash and disinfectant products used must be safe for human consumption and use.
8
The above are all crucial to ensuring the safety of an end product, but it is disputable whether these requirements are sufficient, or even exhaustive. For example, Article 8 (4) provides that ready-to-eat food should be packed with materials that are clean and safe for use: but no mention is made of the packaging used for ready-made food. This is quite typical of the articles contained in 1995 Food Hygiene Law, which covers only very basic practices.
9
Reference to planting and breeding, as these have relevance to food hygiene, is absent. So the law does not take a from-land-to-table approach. The inclusion of certain ingredients in food is illegal only when the ingredients affect the nutrition or hygiene of the food. So to mix a second grade rice with a top grade rice and sell the mix as top grade rice is not illegal under this law because both may be nutritious and hygienic. Of course rice sold in such a way is illegal according to other laws, such as contract law. The method of enumeration adopted in this law to provide rules in a few key articles barely covers the extent and requirements of actual practice.
disinfection; 3) food packaging, containers and equipment; 4) supervision and administrative penalties; 5) food inspection and testing. Before entering the WTO, China made many adjustments to laws and standards in accordance with the provisions of the WTO. In the field of food hygiene standards, the government reviewed 464 standards and identified 1,379 issues 13 . It made huge modifications, raising standards, especially those on the limits of pesticide residues, 85.4% of which now meet Codex requirements 14 . In addition, 81% of the standards on pollutants met Codex standards 15 . On the other hand, where Chinese food producers are capable of producing very safe food, or areas in the food industry where China is mainly a net import market, the government sets food standards even higher than those of the Codex. 16 Both the government and NGOs, i.e., various chambers of commerce which, according to the Chinese law, are non-governmental organisations, can recommend voluntary standards to food producers. These standards focus on many areas of food. Some of them relate to food safety, which may help food producers increase their share in domestic or export food markets. With the improvement of technology and financial ability, more and more food producers adopt many voluntary standards which may lead to better market success.
17 Among all the voluntary standards, the Green Food programme deserves much attention. The green food programme was launched by the Ministry of Agriculture (MOA) in 1992. Two categories of green food, AA and A, are defined by it. AA green food has the same standard for organic food. For example, GM ingredients are not permitted to be used in the production of AA green food. But as much of the land in China is heavily polluted with pesticides or other pollutants, it is not only expensive but also very difficult to produce. Category A green food was created to provide safe food based on the reality of China's natural environment. A green food is of a higher standard than normal food but lower than AA green food or organic food. For example, only limited amounts of pesticide and chemical fertilisers may be used in crop elevation in order to be considered "safe" without affecting yield. The environment, including the land, air and water, where crops are planted or animals live should also meet certain conditions. 18 The green food programme did not develop well in its first few years. Yet, with the export of "normal" food having to meet safety requirements and consumers becoming more aware and more cautious about food safety, green food has become more popular 16 . Growing exports of green food motivated the government to promote the expansion of green food production 17 .
19 The development of a green food industry may have implications for the agricultural policies of other developing countries. Organic food is too expensive for most consumers, even for consumers in developed countries. It cannot therefore be the main direction for the development of agriculture. On the other hand, the health risks associated with the heavy use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides are clear. Green food is a compromise. The cost to produce it is not too high, while the use of chemical fertilisers and pesticides is permitted but heavily restricted to ensure yield and a guaranteed level of food safety.
Genetically modified food 20 Chinese scientists began studying transgenic technology in the early 1980s 18 . They convinced senior Chinese leaders of the potential for genetic modification in agriculture 19 when China was still struggling with food shortages. In the early 1990s the first transgenic plant, tobacco, was planted in several large areas. At that time the planting of transgenic tobacco in China was carried out on an unprecedented scale for transgenic plants in the world 20 . Hebei province trial planted a transgenic cotton with seeds provided by the Monsanto Corporation in 1995 21 . Later two bio-technology joint ventures with Monsanto were set up in Hebei and Anhui provinces. Now in China a total ten GM plants are being trialled 22 . and six may be produced commercially-two kinds of cotton, two kinds of tomato, pimiento and an ornamental named Morning Glory 23 . In 2001 about 600 thousand hectares were planted with GM organisms (GMO) 24 . The decisions to develop and plant GMOs were made solely by the government with no consultation with the public or with academia. According to Article 1, the purposes of the regulations were to promote research and development in genetic modification, strengthen safety management, protect public health and the health of personnel engaged in genetic modification, prevent environmental pollution, and maintain ecological balance. It contains no provision for the control over transgenic product imports. GM foods were imported into China as normal food before 2002. 22 The importation of GM food into China has increased year on year since 1996 25 . Enormous imports of American soybeans had a serious impact on Chinese farmers whose livelihood depends on soybean production 26 . It is a foreseeable result of China's entry into the WTO, that the importation of US-produced GM foods will continue to increase. With more and more GM food finding its way onto the tables of consumers, the problem of safety has been raised. Hence the government has enacted regulations to administrate, inter alia, the safety of imported GM food.
The regulations on the safety of GM food was the first to show dissatisfaction with the way that RASTAP entered into force. Moreover, several of their provisions are ambiguous, in particular the evaluation of the safety of GMOs and their labelling, etc. Due to the above RASTAP did not enter into force on the date provided. As authorised by RASTAP, the MOA is responsible for the supervision and administration of the safety of GMOs. To enforce RASTAP, it enacted three sets of administrative measures in January 2002, which laid down detailed provisions on the safety, import and labelling of transgenic agricultural products. These measures became effective on March 20th 2002.
24 RASTAP and its measures, require the application of two methods to control the safety of transgenic products in international trade. First, Chinese importers or foreign exporters must apply for the transgenic products which may be imported later to be risk assessed. The Committee on the Safety of Agricultural Transgenic Organisms, which is affiliated to the MOA, is responsible for accepting this application, but may only do so twice a year. It must complete the assessment and respond to the applicant within nine months from the date of acceptance. Second, foreign exporters must label their transgenic products.
25 The three sets of measures were promulgated only two months prior to their effective date, causing many difficulties for importers of GMOs. Since risk assessments take nine months, it was impossible for importers to obtain the certificates required on the date of effect. The MOA had to make a transitional arrangement if it did not want the importation of GMOs, especially of soybean, to be halted. Administrative Measures on the Safety of Transgenic Engineering is silent on trade of transgenic products as this is the remit of the Ministry of Commerce. In fact superfluous laws and regulations impair rather than enhance administration on food safety, and increase law enforcement costs, leaving food producers confused. 28 The involvement of so many authorities also cause problems of co-ordination from enactment to enforcement. The State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) was instituted in 2003, with the mandate, inter alia, to integrate the administration and supervision of food safety, co-ordinate and organise investigation and impose penalties for serious violations of the law. The SFDA, however, has no teeth. Its powers relating to food safety are held by other ministries and agencies, while the SFDA itself is a semiministry. It has to co-ordinate among several ministries that have a higher administrative rank. When there is a conflict between these organs, the SFDA's decisions or opinions have no power and are unlikely to be executed.
29 So far its main progress made relating to food safety is its Food and Drug Safety Reassurance Programme, which demands that the MOA, MOH, GAQSIQ, SAIC, MOC, Ministry of Public Security (MPS) and the General Administration of Customs (CGA) should, within their respective scope, take steps to ensure food safety 32 . Yet it is almost impossible for the SFDA to successfully fulfil its co-ordination mission while so much overlap and separate jurisdictions remain.
30 For example, the MOH is entitled to grant a hygiene licence to a food producer, which is an essential measure to ensure food safety. Meanwhile, since 2002 GAQSIQ has been entitled to grant safety licences to food producers. In the MOH's view GAQSIQ's safety licences are unnecessary. After the MOA published several administrative measures relating to GMOs, the MOH also enacted The Administrative Measures on the Hygiene of GM Food. In fact, different organs often make their own plans relating to food safety, a situation where overlap or conflict is common.
31 Green Food is governed by the Centre of Green Food, affiliated to the MOA, while organic food is governed by the Centre of Organic Food, affiliated to the State Environmental Protection Administration 33 . The standards for Class AA green food are almost the same as those for organic food. In practice they compete with each other. This situation is wasteful of the resources of the state. Similarly, the safety of GM agricultural products is governed by the MOA, while the safety of normal food products is governed by the MOH. 32 This disordered situation will not easily be improved in the near future, because it relates to the redistribution of powers among different organs, a difficult move. Moreover, the administration of food is in itself especially difficult, particularly for China, with the world's largest population.
Inefficient administration through punishment 33 The main administrative work done by administrative organs is inspecting, several times a year, compliance with the Food Hygiene Law. The government does not attach enough importance to supervise the course of food production, or to help food producers increase their own capacity to ensure food safety. Most inspection work is about finding and punishing those food producers that break the law. food producers 34 . Those found to be involved in illegal activity were punished, fined or had their licences revoked, etc.. 34 Other schemes or programmes which may work well to enhance food safety, such as taking a from-land-to-table approach, recalling of products not meeting standards, etc., and enhancing the traceability of food, etc. Penalties per se are neither an effective nor sufficient means of ensuring food safety. Solely announcing that the banning of certain pesticides will not guarantee food safety. Such pesticides must be recalled and destroyed to ensure their trade and use cannot continue.
Trade interests 35 The improvement of food safety is not only driven by safety concerns, but also by trade interests. Although this may not be true in all countries (it is the case in many countries), China seems to give more weight to trade. One purpose of the administration of food hygiene is to support food exportation because China produces more agricultural products than it needs 35 . In accordance with the Action Plan on Food Safety published by the MOH in September 2003, the government will "modify food safety regulations and standards from time to time to ensure that food hygiene regulations and standards meet the needs of food importation and exportation to protect consumer health" 36 . This approach may be typical in many developing countries. 36 The enforcement of GM safety regulations sheds light on China's concerns about trade interests in the field of food safety. After the promulgation of The Administrative Labelling Measures, the MOA published the first list of GMO to be labelled 37 . On this important list, only five categories of transgenic organisms, soya 38 , maize 39 , cotton 40 , tomato 41 and rapeseeds 42 , are required to be labelled. Even for these five categories, not all products that include them must be labelled. Take soya as an example. According to this list, only five soya products required labelling. Soy milk, soy sauce and beancurd are not included. If safety were top priority, labelling of all food containing a certain percentage of GMO ingredients would be required. Soy sauce and beancurd are consumed extensively in China. Made using certain traditional Chinese methods, they are seldom imported from other countries. But if this is why they are not required to be labelled even if made using transgenic soya, the government's concern about GMOs seems disingenuous. 37 The 2002 Administrative Labelling Measures also have application to imported products. However, until the summer of 2003, the government did not inspect products in its domestic market for compliance with the labelling measures 43 . It was found that almost all transgenic soy oil producers breached this labelling rule before they were forced to comply through this inspection. But other GM food remained unlabelled in supermarkets up to the end of 2003. 38 In addition, the Administrative Labelling Measures did not clearly specify the minimum amount of any one transgenic ingredient in a product before this must be labelled. Thus it is not clear whether a mix of transgenic products with traditional products shall be labelled. Such mixing is more frequent in domestic products than in imported products.
Problems associated with rapid industrialisation
39 Although the government has done much to enforce and supervise the application of the food hygiene law, the food safety situation in China today remains unsatisfactory. In 2001 more than 19,000 people were poisoned in 611 food poisoning cases 44 . In 2002
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China Perspectives, 53 | May-June 2004 more than 11,000 people were poisoned in 464 food poisoning cases 45 . It is surprising that most poisoning cases occurred in families 46 due to unsafe food products.
40 A large amount of unsafe foods are produced in areas that are no more rural but not yet urban, where the governance from both countryside and cities is weak. Following the process of industrialisation, cities expand as do the areas between the countryside and cities. However, governance by the municipal administrations has not yet expanded accordingly to the boundary of cities, on the other hand, the governance of villages is rapidly declining as farmers are losing their land. Many illegal food producers rent houses in these special areas to produce or process food and sell them in the city markets.
In the gray zones between town and country the authorities often lack authority © Imaginechina 41 The case of "swill oil" (ganshui you) or "drain oil" (digou you) is typical 47 . It is said that in the suburbs of Peking alone, there may be more than 1,000 producers refining this kind of oil. Some producers may have been there for more than thirty years although the Peking Administration of Environmental Protection has cracked down many times. Moreover, to deal with one case of oil from swill, several organs have to act together, because the MOH is in charge of swill, the AEP is in charge of waste water and SAIC is in charge of business licences. This also explains how the problem of over-administration impedes the administration of food safety.
42 Now the SFDA has decided to enhance the administration in the grey zones between the cities and the countryside. But so far there are no special measures targeting administration in this jumbled area.
43 The MOH published a very ambitious Action Plan for Food Safety, which sets out a series of goals for food safety to be reached before or by 2008 48 . But it is highly 49 . Pesticides are heavily used in planting, of them 70% are very poisonous 50 . Several pesticides now forbidden in the European Union are still in use in China 51 . Pesticide residues on vegetables are so common and so dense that many hygiene experts suggest washing vegetables first then dunking them in hot water before cooking or eating them 52 . The power to administrate chemical fertilisers, pesticides and animal medicines is in the hands of the MOA, who is also the main user and beneficiary. The MOA should supervise the process of planting and breeding. The new Regulations on the Safety of Agricultural Products, which are still in their early stage of drafting, are to be enacted by the authority. 45 Although the chain from land to table has been cut into several administrative sections, the MOH seems decided to do its best in its own section. 46 Over-administration, where several organs have the power to administrate the production and sale of food, will remain the most difficult problem in the implementation and supervision of food safety law and regulations. It is a major challenge for the state to establish a mechanism that will enable different bureaucracies to work efficiently and effectively in co-operation. Just like in the abovementioned swill case, if the relative organs cannot act at the same time, illegal producers will escape.
47 There were a total 382,737 food producing or processing entities in China in 2002 55 . Most were medium-sized or small, from which most food with safety problems originated. Although Chinese are becoming rich, the average income of urban residents is only 716 yuan (US$86) a month 56 , which is much higher than that of rural residents. The large number of low income residents are a stable contingent and major consumers of poor quality food. "Swill oil" is targeted at such consumers. In 2002 the MOH inspected 505,084 food producers 57 including cafeterias and restaurants nationwide, 13.68% of those inspected were found in breach of the law 58 . Given China's vast size, how to supervise so many small food producers is a massive challenge for the government. This is a common challenge for most developing countries, where most food producers are medium-sized or small businesses, lacking the ability and resources to implement self-management in food safety. 48 China began to regulate food safety immediately following the resolution of its food
shortages. Yet China has not established a legal system efficient in ensuring food safety. 
